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Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775

(1989).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits
an employer from discriminating against individuals on the basis
of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.' The statute is
sweeping in its language. 2 Title VII includes neither a definition
of discrimination, nor a standard for determining liability. 3 In

effect, the language of Title VII requires the courts to interpret the causation requirement 4 and to allocate the burden of
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The pertinent portion of Title VII provides:
Employer practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
2 See id. at § 2000e-2(a)(l).
3 See id. at § 2000e-2. One of the major statutory provisions on relief in employment discrimination is section 7 0 6 (g) of Title VII which prescribes:
If the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ...or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate ....

No order of the

court shall require [relief in any form] if such individual was refused
admission, suspended... [or discharged] for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or
in violation of the [substantive provisions of the Act].
Id. at § 2000e-5(g).
4 Employment discrimination litigation is generally bifurcated into the issue of
liability and the form of relief. Belton, Causation in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 34
WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1238, 1252-53 (1988). To determine substantive liability,
causation analysis begins with an interpretation of the words "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. at § 2000e2(a)(1). "Because of" has been construed to mean "a substantial factor," a "motivating factor," and "but for" causation. See Brodin, The Standardof Causation in the
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proof5 when faced with a Title VII claim. For over two decades, a
division of opinion among the circuit courts has resulted.6 This
uncertainty at the circuit court level has been aggravated by the
United States Supreme Court's unsuccessful efforts to enunciate

a central rule on both these issues. 7 The Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins' attempted to advance the evolution of Title
VII "disparate treatment" claims.9 The Price Waterhouse Court

held that once a plaintiff demonstrates that an illegitimate factor
was a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
must show that the same decision would have been made absent
the unlawful factor to avoid liability.' 0
In 1989, Ann Hopkins, a senior manager in the Washington,
Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 293
nn.5-10 and accompanying text (1982).
5 The procedural aspect of causation requires the courts to allocate the burden
of proof on the causation element and determine the proper evidentiary standard
to judge whether the burden has been satisfied. Belton, supra note 4, at 1236. The
burden of proof includes the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (3d ed. 1984). The burden of production is the task of producing sufficient evidence on an issue to warrant a finding for
the party alleging the violation. Id. Generally, the burden of production falls on
the pleading party. Id. Once all of the evidence has been introduced, if the factfinder is still in doubt, he must decide against the party with the burden of persuasion. Id. This is referred to as the risk of nonpersuasion. Id. The allocation of the
burden of persuasion is decisive in cases where there is doubt as to the existence of
the alleged fact. Id.
6 See Mendez, Presumptions of DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1130-31 (1980); Note, The Prima Facie Case Approach to
Employment, 33 ME. L. REV. 196 (1981).
7 See Mendez, supra note 6, at 1130-31; Note, supra note 6.
8 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
9 The Supreme Court has adopted two principal theories of discrimination
under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 3-5 (2d ed.
1988). Disparate treatment cases are those which involve claims that an employer
treated one employee more favorably than another. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The disparate impact theory of discrimination
was best summarized in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977) as "the use of employment policies that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id. at 325 n. 16. See also
Note, United State Supreme Court Clarifies Standardsfor StatisticalEvidence and Burdens of
Proofin Private Litigation Under the DisparateImpact Theory-Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 831 (1990) (authored by E. Meyer).
Price Waterhouse is the Court's fifth attempt to clarify the allocation of the burden of proof. The first four decisions which also addressed disparate treatment
issued were McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24 (1978), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
10 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795.
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D.C. office of Price Waterhouse, brought suit against her employer."I Hopkins was the only woman among eighty-eight people selected as candidates for partnership in 1982.12 At Price
Waterhouse, partners are selected through a lengthy review process, initiated when a partner submits a senior manager's name
as a candidate. 3 Thereafter, all of the firm's partners are invited
to prepare written comments on the candidate.' 4 Upon recommendation by the Admissions Committee, the Policy Board decides whether to submit the candidate's name for a vote, put the
application on hold, or reject the application.' 5 Hopkins' candidacy was put on hold.' 6
In recommending Hopkins, supporters emphasized her role
in securing a twenty-five million dollar contract and described
her as an "outstanding professional" who had a "deft touch, a
strong character, independence and integrity."' 7 Both supportII Id. at 1780-81. On remand, a federal district court in Washington applied
that holding and ordered Price Waterhouse to award a partnership to Hopkins.
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
12 Id. at 1781. At the time that Hopkins initiated this case, there were 662 partners in the firm of which seven were women. Id. Hopkins was proposed for partnership by the Office of Government Services (OGS). Id. The OGS specialized in
designing and implementing consulting projects for government agencies. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 825 F.2d
458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). When Hopkins was proposed
for partnership, there were no female partners in the OGS. Id. Significantly, Hopkins attempted to reinforce her claim of disparate treatment through the use of
statistics showing the small number of female partners in the firm. Id. at 1116. The
district court, however, found these statistics to be inconclusive, because women
had not been in the accounting profession in large numbers long enough to infer
that the low level of female partners was the result of discrimination, and because
there was evidence that several potential female partners were hired away from
Price Waterhouse. Id.
13 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
14 Id. The partners either submit long or short form evaluations depending on
the extent of their contact with the candidate. See Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
These forms include 48 different categories ranging from practice development
and technical expertise to interpersonal skills and participation in civic activities.
Id. In these categories, the partners are asked to numerically rank the candidate
compared to recent partnership candidates. Id. The forms also include a space for
comments on the candidate. Id. The firm's Admission's Committee evaluates all of
the written comments and then makes a recommendation to the Policy Committee.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1781.
15 Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1781. Of the 88 candidates considered, 47 were
admitted to the partnership, 21 were denied admissions, and 20 of the candidates
were put on hold. Id.
16 Id. There are no fixed guidelines for partnership; negative comments do not
necessarily defeat the candidacy, nor do positive comments guarantee partnership.
Id. The district court did emphasize that negative comments and "no" votes are
given substantial weight by the firm. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1116.
17 Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1782.
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ers and opponents, however, commented on her poor interpersonal relations with her staff.' These comments indicated that,
at times, she appeared overly aggressive and unduly harsh. 19
There was also evidence that some partners reacted negatively
toward Hopkins because she was a woman.2 ° Certain partners
described her as "macho," advised her to attend charm school,
and criticized her for using unladylike language.' When told of
the Policy Board's decision to put her candidacy on hold, the senior partner in her office, and perhaps her biggest supporter,
counseled her regarding the problems the Board had with her
candidacy. 22 He advised Hopkins that her chances for partnership would improve if she would "walk more femininely, wear
more make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. ' 23 Less
than one year later, Hopkins learned that she again would not be
recommended for partnership. 4 Hopkins then sued Price
Waterhouse in the United States Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia under Title VII, claiming that Price
25
Waterhouse had discriminated against her on the basis of sex.
The district court held that Price Waterhouse violated Title
VII by maintaining a partnership evaluation process that allowed
stereotypical comments to flourish and possibly bias individual
evaluations.2 6 The district court also determined that Hopkins
was not entitled to equitable relief if Price Waterhouse could
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the same decision
would have been made absent the unlawful discrimination.27 In
light of the evidence, the district judge determined that Price
Waterhouse had not met this burden.28
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.

22 Id.
23 Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.

1985), aft'd, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)).
24 Id. at 1781 n.l.
25 Id. at 1781.
26 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1119-20. The district court found that Price Waterhouse should have known that women who were evaluated by male partners may
receive stereotypical comments. Id. Yet, the court noted that Price Waterhouse did
nothing to discourage this practice. Id. Price Waterhouse made no efforts to investigate whether comments were in fact the result of stereotyping, nor did they take
any steps to exclude those individuals from the evaluation process. Id.
27 Id. at 1120 (citing Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
28 Id. The court, however, also determined that Hopkins had "the burden of
proving that she was constructively discharged." Id. at 1121. The district court
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The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of
liability. 29 The appellate court noted that Hopkins produced sufficient direct evidence that her sex was a significant factor in Price
Waterhouse's evaluation of her candidacy. 3 0 In accordance with
the district court's analysis, the appellate court confirmed that
Price Waterhouse did not demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the same decision would have been made absent
the discriminatory factor.3 ' The appellate court remanded the
case, however, on the question of relief.-2 In the appellate
court's view, the decision not to renominate Hopkins for partnership was, in effect, a constructive discharge." Hopkins was thus
entitled to backpay between the time of the partnership decision
and her resignation. 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 5 In a
plurality decision, the Court determined that once a plaintiff
proves that illegitimate factors played a motivating role in an em36
ployment decision, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
The defendant, the plurality held, may avoid liability by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision
would have been made absent consideration of the discriminaheld that Hopkins failed to prove that she was constructively discharged, and thus,
was not entitled to court order granting her partnership. Id. (citing Clark v. Marsh,
665 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII plaintiff is deemed
to have been constructively discharged in presence of aggravating factors)). Here,
the court found that Hopkins resigned voluntarily and not as a result of intolerable
working conditions. Id. But see Clark, 665 F.2d 1775-76 ("the predictable humiliation and loss of prestige accompanying her failure to obtain this particular position
constitute[s] the 'aggravating factors' required"). Hopkins was thus entitled to a
judgment in her favor on the issue of liability and attorney's fees. Hopkins, 618 F.
Supp. at 1121. Backpay would have been awarded to Hopkins if both parties had
not agreed, without prior consent of the court, to defer calculating backpay until
after liability was determined. Id.
29 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
30 Id. at 470. The court determined that once Hopkins presented direct evidence that sex was a significant factor in the evaluation process, the question of
whether Hopkins herself was discriminated against because of her sex was no
longer an issue. Id. (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989).
36 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787-88 (1989).
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The plurality remanded the decision to the appellate court for a determination
of whether Price Waterhouse met
38
this reduced burden.
To appreciate the significance of Price Waterhouse and its affect on prior case law, it is important to trace the Court's historical development of standards governing the order and allocation
of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases.3 9 Disparate treatment cases are those which involve claims that an employer
treated one employee less favorably than another employee
based on illegitimate criteria. 40 Allocating the burdens of production and persuasion can be determinative of the outcome of
disparate treatment cases, given the typical imbalance between

the information and resources available to employer-defendants
versus that available to employee-plaintiffs. 4 ' Therefore, the
Court developed relatively lenient requirements to establish a
37

Id. at 1795.

38

Id.

See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (defendant bears only the burden of production to rebut prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times); Board of
Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (merely articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is sufficient to rebut prima facie case); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (scope of prima facie case and nature of evidence
necessary to rebut it); Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) (when plaintiff proves constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial
part of employment decision, employer can avoid remedial action by demonstrating by preponderance of evidence that the same decision would have been made
absent consideration of protected conduct); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) (elements of prima facie case, and nature and order of proof).
See generally Brodin, supra note 4 (reviewing development of mixed-motive causation
in disparate treatment case law); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case
in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979) (Burger Court's influence in disparate treatment cases); Mendez, supra note 6 (reviewing
disparate treatment case law in light of presumption of discriminatory motive, and
advocating that employer's superior access to information should conform to evidentiary rule which places greater burden on employer).
40 See supra note 9 (defining the court's distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact cases).
See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 3, 4, & 5 (2d ed. 1988). There are two major subdivisions of the theory of
disparate treatment: systemic disparate treatment and individual disparate treatment. Id. at 38. Both theories are used to address intentional discrimination. Id.
Systemic disparate treatment applies to systems of intentional discrimination such
as a policy requiring prison guards to be the same gender as inmates when in contact positions. Id. at 38-39 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)).
Individual disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats some employees
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or natural origin. Id. at 39. Both individual and systemic disparate treatment require proof of
discriminatory motive, but the methods of proof differ. Id.
41 Mendez, supra note 6, at 1130.
39

866

SE TON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:860

prima facie case of discrimination when it formulated an evidentiary framework for disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.42

In McDonnell Douglas, Green was a black civil rights activist
and former employee of McDonnell Douglas who was fired and
not rehired by the company.4 3 Green was discharged in an overall reduction of McDonnell Douglas' work force.4 4 Green
claimed that the layoff as well as McDonnell Douglas' general hiring practices were racially motivated.45 In protest, he illegally
blocked access to its plant by way of a civil rights demonstration.4 6 When Green was not rehired after responding to a subsequent public advertisement by McDonnell Douglas, he sued the
company.47 He claimed that the decision not to rehire him was
because of his race and his participation in the civil rights protest.48 Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, set forth

the essential elements of a prima facie discrimination case. The
Court determined that the plaintiff must show that he belongs to
a protected group, that he applied and was qualified for ajob for
which the employer was seeking applicants, that despite the qualifications, he was rejected, and that the job remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants with the same qualifications. 49 Once a prima facie case is established, the Court
opined, the burden of production shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 50 If successfully rebutted, the employee is
42 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
43 Id. at 796.
44 Id. at 794.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 796.
48 Id. Green first filed a complaint

with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, but the Commission made no finding of racial bias. Id. at 796-97.
The Commission, however, found it reasonable to believe that McDonnell Douglas
had based its decision not to rehire Green on his civil rights activity. Id. at 797.
After unsuccessful efforts by the Commission to resolve the dispute, Green was
advised of his right to bring a civil rights action in federal court. Id.
Green claimed a violation of sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 McDonnell Doulgas, 411 U.S. at 796 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l)
and 2000e-3(a) (1982)). Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in part
provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter ....
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796 n.4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a) (1982)).
49 McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
50 Id.
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then given the opportunity to demonstrate that the legitimate
reason articulated was in fact a pretext. 5 ' This three tiered order
and allocation of proof mirrors that typically used in civil cases.52
At this early stage in the development of Title VII case law,
the Court addressed a related issue. A unanimous Court in
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle5 examined the circumstances under which remedial action is justified when protected first amendment activity is a substantial part
of an employment decision.54 Mount Healthy was critical to the
evolution of Title VII litigation. 55 The case involved the Mount
51 Id. at 807. See generally Zimmer & Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual
Disparate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and Burdens of Proof,9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 41-43 (1986) (discussing difficulty of proving intentional discrimination). Pretext can be demonstrated by 1)
showing that the reason provided does not apply, 2) producing evidence of prior
unequal treatment, 3) demonstrating that the reason was not relied on previously
or only is applied in a discriminatory manner, or 4) introducing statistics used to
show systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact. Id. at 42.
52 Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301; see also Mendez, supra note 6 (discussing burden of proof in disparate treatment case law, comparing it to traditional allocation of proof, and arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 301 should be tailored with basic policies of Title
VII to fashion more equitable distribution of order and allocation of proof). The
McDonnell Douglas evidentiary approach primarily reflected the difficulty with proving unlawful motives in employment decisions. Stonefield, NondeterminativeDiscrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of DiscriminationLaw, 35 BUFFALO L. REV.
85, 108 (1986). This three-tiered evidentiary approach is now well-entrenched in
Title VII litigation, as well as in age discrimination cases. Id. at 108 n.78. Rarely
are there cases where plaintiffs have direct proof, or "a smoking gun," of discrimination. Id. Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas framework created a rebuttable presumption that the employer discriminated against the employee. Id. at 109.
53 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
54 Id. at 285. In Mount Healthy, the Court specifically addressed the scope of
relief available to a plaintiff once liability was established. See generally Wolly, What
Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 385, 392 (1980) ("the Court 'rejected
the [district court's] view that a public employee must be reinstatedwhenever constitutionally protected conduct plays a "substantial" part in the employer's decision to
terminate' ") (emphasis in original).
55 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1789-90 (1989). It is important to appreciate that the "same decision" test employed in Mount Healthy was
directed to the appropriate remedy, while in Price Waterhouse it was invoked as an
affirmative defense to liability. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. See also
infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (arguing for "same decision" test to be
applied only to determination of relief). This application of the "same decision"
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Healthy Board of Education's decision not to renew the employment contract of Doyle, an untenured teacher.5 6 The Board's decision was based upon a telephone call which Doyle made to a
57
radio station voicing his opposition to the school's dress code.
The Court acknowledged that the telephone call was protected
conduct under the first amendment.5 8 The Mount Healthy Court
reasoned, however, that an employee should not be placed in a
"better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing."' 5 9 Thus, the Court held that once a plaintiff demonstrated
that constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial factor in
an adverse employment decision, in order to avoid remedial action, the employer must show that the same decision would have
been made in the absence of the protected factor. 6°
Although some circuits followed the Mount Healthy approach
to causation in deciding Title VII cases, the Court did not incorporate a Mount Healthy standard in the Title VII disparate treatment cases which immediately followed. 6 '
Further, the
framework presented in McDonnell Douglas did not prove adequate for the number of complex discrimination claims brought
under Title VII during the next decade.6 2 In particular, the
test was proposed by Mark Brodin and has received support among notable commentators. See Brodin, supra note 4, at 323 (applying "same decision" test to determine the appropriate remedy serves deterrent and compensatory purposes of Title
VII); Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 51, at 48-49 ("separating the liability finding
from the fashioning of relief and shifting the burden of persuasion on the intent
issue in the remedy phase can vindicate the policy of eradicating all discrimination,
while not giving undeserving plaintiffs a windfall"); Wolly, supra note 54, at 392
(Mount Healthy test should not be applied to evaluate "constitutional merits of the
employer's decision," but to evaluate the injury itself).
56 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-83.
57 Id. at 282. Doyle had also made obscene gestures to female students in the
cafeteria when they ignored his directions. Id. at 281-82.
58 Id. at 283.
59 Id. at 285.
60 Id. at 285, 287 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977)).
61 See Wolly, supra note 54, at 390-91 n.48 (citing lower court cases which applied Mount Healthy standard to question of relief); but cf. Brodin, supra note 4, at
310 n.80 (citing lower court cases which applied Mount Healthy to determine liability).
The Supreme Court cases which immediately followed Mount Healthy applied
the McDonnell Douglas three tier order and allocation of proof. See, e.g., Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
62 Compare, e.g.,
Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.
1977) (if factual truth of employer's reason is disputed, employer has burden of
proving by preponderance of evidence that there were legitimate, nondiscrimina-
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lower courts struggled with standards to determine the sufficiency of the rebuttal. 63 In view of this confusion, the Court directly addressed the burden of proof issue on two separate
occasions in 1978: Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 6' and Board
of Trustees v. Sweeney. 65 While both cases affirmed the McDonnell
Douglas three step approach,66 neither case added meaningful
guidance regarding the employer's burden of rebutting a prima
facie case.67
Furnco involved allegations that three brick layers were refused employment because of their race. 68 The Court applied
the McDonnell Douglas framework and held that the plaintiffs met
the basic requirements for a prima facie case. 69 The Furnco majority emphasized, however, that a prima facie case is not an ultimate finding of fact as to discrimination. 7' Again employing
McDonnell Douglas language, the Court stated that the employer
need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection" to rebut the adverse inference arising from a prima facie case. 7 '
Less than five months later, a sharply divided Court in Sweetory reasons for action) with Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th
Cir. 1977) (simple introduction of evidence supporting legitimate reason for discharge is sufficient to require employee to show that reason offered was a pretext).
63 See Recent Cases, When the PlaitiffHas Proven a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination, the Defendant Bears the Burden Only of Explaining Clearly the Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Its Actions-Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 50 CIN. L. REV.
628, 631 n.34 (1981) (citing cases which held that once employee establishes prima
facie case of discrimination, "the employer bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons existed for
the action"); but cf. id. at 631 n.35 (citing circuits which place burden of articulation
on employer).
64 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
65 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
66 See Note, Title VII-Employment Discrimination-Defendant'sBurden of Proofin Rebutting Plaintifs Prima Facie Case, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1477, 1481-82 (1982) (describing lack of clarity in Sweeney and Furnco).
67
68

Id.

Furnco, 438 U.S. at 569. Furnco Construction did not maintain a permanent
work force of bricklayers. Id. Instead, it hired a superintendent for each specific
job, who in turn selected the necessary workers. Id. at 569-70. The chosen workers
were generally either skilled firebricklayers or those recommended by the general
foreman. Id. at 572.
69 Id. at 575.
70 Id. at 577. The Court stated that a prima facie case gives rise to an inference
of discrimination because there is a presumption that, if unexplained, the decision
was more likely than not based on impermissible factors. Id. (citing International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)).
71 Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)).
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ney overturned an appellate court's decision requiring the plaintiff to "prove absence of discriminatory motive."' 72 Reaffirming
McDonnell Douglas and Furnco, the Sweeney Court distinguished
"between merely articulat[ing] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" and "prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive."' T" In

a two paragraph per curiam decision, the Court emphasized that
the mere articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification suffices to meet a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 4 Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that "proving" and
"articulating" conveyed the same meaning in the context of
a
trial-that proof must be offered to articulate a factual defense.75
The Sweeney dissent criticized the majority's distinction between
establishing a legitimate reason for the employment decision and
demonstrating the lack of discriminatory motive. 7 6 Both, Justice
Stevens noted, are simultaneously demonstrated.77
Three years later, the Court reconsidered this issue; lower
courts were far from agreement on the appropriate standard of
proof and neither Furnco, nor Sweeney eradicated these
problems.78 In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,79
the Court addressed a Title VII gender discrimination challenge
involving Burdine's failure to be promoted and her subsequent
termination.8" Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, de72 Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (quoting Sweeney v.
Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.), vacated, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (emphasis omitted)).
73 Id. at 25.
74 Id. at 24-25. The Court criticized the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
for imposing a heavier burden on the employer by requiring the employer "to
prove absence of discriminatory motive." Id.
75 Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he employer's burden ... is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done or produc[es]
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons .... They do not have the burden of establishing that their basis was sound."); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979) ("burden of persuasion at all times [stays] with the
plaintiff, and . . . the employer's burden ... . is a burden of production-i.e., a
burden to articulate or state a valid reason, following which the complainant must
show that the reason so articulated ... is a mere pretext . . .") (emphasis in original). In fact, the Fifth Circuit continued to apply the preponderance rule believing
it to be consistent with Sweeney: "This court requires defendant to prove nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderance of the evidence. This holding is not inconsistent with [Sweeney] which merely stated that defendant is not required to prove
absence of discriminatory motive." Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs,
608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (citations omitted).
79 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
80 Id. at 250-51.
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termined that the employer did not sufficiently rebut Burdine's
prima facie case of gender discrimination simply by testifying that
Burdine was refused a promotion because her poor interpersonal
relations with two other employees would have adversely affected
office efficiency. 8 ' The Burdine Court held that the burden which
shifts to the defendant is one of production-to produce evidence that the plaintiff was rejected for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.8 2
In unambiguous language, the Burdine majority stated that
the employer need not persuade a court that the legitimate reason set forth was decisive in the challenged employment decision. 3 Rather, the employer must produce evidence only to
raise a genuine issue of fact. 4 Once this is accomplished, the
Court reiterated that the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
employer's proffered reasons did not dictate the ultimate decision.8 5 In effect, the plaintiff must prove that they were the victim of discrimination as proscribed by Title VII. s6 In light of the

Price Waterhouse decision, it is interesting that in both Sweeney and
Burdine the Court criticized the lower courts for imposing a heavier burden on the employer.8 7 The Burdine Court did, however,
require the employer's reasons to be "clear and reasonably
specific." 88

On its face, the plurality's decision in Price Waterhouse appears
inconsistent with this line of cases.8 9 Justice Brennan, writing for
81 Id. at 251-52. The Court stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals would require
the defendant to introduce evidence which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This
exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden of production." Id. at
257 (emphasis in original).
82 Id. at 254-55.
83 Id. at 254. See Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 51, at 39-41 (illustrating how an
employer may rebut presumption of discrimination).
84 Id. at 254-55.
85
86

Id. at 256.

Id. The Court stated that the plaintiff had to prove that she was the victim of
intentionaldiscrimination. Id. Intention is a necessary element of a disparate treatment case, but is not a necessary element of a disparate impact case. For a brief
discussion of the differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact see
supra notes 9 & 39.
87 See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978); Burdine, 450 U.S. at

258.
88 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. The Court further noted that the employer would
still retain an incentive to convince the trier of fact that there was a lawful reason
for the employment decision, because the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate pretext.
Id.
89 Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787-88 (1989) (once
plaintiff shows that gender played motivating part in employment decision, to avoid
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the plurality, determined that the employer could avoid liability
by demonstrating, through an affirmative defense, that a legitimate factor was the motivating part of the employment decision." The plurality reasoned that the employer must persuade
the fact finder that it would have reached the same employment
decision, absent the illegal factor.9" The plurality sought to distinguish this case, and thus preserve McDonnell Douglas and its
progeny, by emphasizing that Price Waterhouse applied to cases involving mixed-motives and cases where the plaintiff demonstrated that the protected factor played a motivating role in the
employment decision. 92 In so holding, the Price Waterhouse pluliability, defendant must persuade court that same decision would have been made
without consideration of gender) with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 807 (1973) (employee must be given fair opportunity to establish that employer's reason for employment decision was pretext) and Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("plaintiff must be given the opportunity to introduce evidence that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination") and Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 27 ("ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
discrimination remains with the plaintiff, who must convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been the victim of discrimination") and
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff").
90 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88. The Court reasoned that "the employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff
must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to
prevail, must persuade it on another." Id. at 1788.
91 Id. at 1787-88.
92 Id. at 1787-89. McDonnell Douglas, Furnco, Sweeney and Burdine are all pretext
cases. This is the first occasion that the Court examined a mixed-motive case within
the context of an individual disparate treatment claim, and therefore, distinguished
between mixed-motive cases and pretextual cases. Id. A case involving mixed-motives arises when a personnel decision is motivated by both discriminatory and legitimate factors. Id. at 1791-92. A pretext analysis arises when the proffered
reason for the employment decision is shown by the party alleging discrimination
to be a disguise for discrimination. It presumes that the decision was based on a
single motive, either legitimate or illegitimate. See Brodin, supra note 4, at 301
n.40. In a pretextual analysis, the plaintiff must show that the single motive was
unlawful by demonstrating that the legitimate reasons offered were not the true
reasons for the decision. Id. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 282 n.10 (1976). McDonald concerned a claim of unequal treatment by two
white employees who were fired for stealing from a company's shipment of inventory, while a black employee who was also involved in the theft was retained. Id. at
275-76. The plaintiffs asserted that the employer's reliance on the theft incident as
cause for dismissal was a pretext for reverse discrimination. Id. The Court
explained:
The use of the term "pretext" in this context does not mean, of course,
that the Title VII plaintiff must show that he would have in any event
been rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficiencies . . . no more is required to be shown
than that race was a "but-for" cause.
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rality differentiated between mixed-motive cases and pretext
cases. 93 In mixed-motive cases, Justice Brennan noted that the
issue of whether the nondiscriminatory reason was the true reason-the question raised in Burdine-is inappropriate because no
one reason dictates the ultimate decision.94 The plurality contended that in mixed-motive cases, the employer considers discriminatory, as well as legitimate reasons.95 The fact that gender
was a motivating factor in the employment decision in Price
Waterhouse, Justice Brennan reasoned, did not constitute a violation of Title VII. 96 Rather, the plurality concluded that the employer must show that the legitimate reason in and of itself would
have been determinative in making the same decision.97
The plurality justified this causation requirement through an
analysis of the history and statutory language of Title VII.9 8 In

Justice Brennan's view, Congress sought to balance the employer's freedom of choice with the employee's civil rights. 99
While the plurality admitted that a person's gender should not be
considered in an employment decision, preserving the employer's freedom of choice in the plurality's view requires that an
employer not be held liable if it would have made the same decision absent the protected factor.'l° Justice Brennan recognized
that the employee's rights have been violated because an illegitimate factor was considered, but nonetheless allowed the emId. at 282 n.10. It is noteworthy that from this footnote, a pretextual analysis became equated with the "but-for" test of causation. See Belton, supra note 4, at 126061.
The Price Waterhouse plurality, however, did not suggest that a case must be
classified as either a pretext case or a mixed-motive case. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.
Ct. at 1789 n.12. The plurality stated that they expected plaintiffs to generally allege that their case is pretextual and, in the alternative, involved mixed-motive. Id.
Upon discovery, the parties would determine whether both illegitimate and legitimate considerations played a role in the decision. Id. Once a district court decides
whether an illegitimate factor played a part, it must apply either the McDonnell Douglas or the Price Waterhouse framework. Id. Contrary to the dissent, the plurality did
not fear that this evidentiary scheme will confuse the factfinder. Id. The plurality
supported its position by noting that the same scheme was endorsed in Mount
Healthy and was subsequently followed. Id. See also Brodin, supra note 4, at 304-08
(describing the Court's treatment of mixed-motive causation claims).
93 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-89.
94 Id. at 1788-89.
95 Id. at 1789.
96 Id. at 1786.
97 Id. at 1792.
98 Id. at 1784-86.
99 Id. at 1784-85.
100 Id. at 1785-86.
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ployer to avoid liability.' ° '
The plurality found support for this rationale in other Title
VII and non-Title VII cases.' 1 2 Justice Brennan noted that employers must demonstrate why gender was a criterion when the
employer asserted that there was a bona fide occupational hazard
within the meaning of Section 703(e) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; employers must prove that payment of disparate salaries
authorized under the Equal Pay Act are not sex linked; and employers must show why work limitations are imposed on pregnant women under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.' 0 3
Similarly, the plurality recognized that in first amendment challenges the Court has unanimously held that when constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
adverse treatment, the employer must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the same decision would have been made
absent consideration of the protected speech. 10 4 Justice Brennan
also reiterated that the Court has held that an employer could
avoid liability under the National Labor Relations Act, if, once it
has been shown that union activities contributed to the em101 See id. at 1785. More specifically, the plurality noted that "since we know that
the words 'because of' do not mean 'solely because of,' we also know that Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). But cf. id. at
1786 ("the preservation of this freedom means that an employer shall not be liable
if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come
to the same decision"). It appears that by absolving the employer from liability on
this basis, the plurality effectively tipped the scale towards the employer.
102 See id. at 1784-94. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Title
VII prohibits statutory weight and height requirements for correctional counselor
trainee when employer failed to show evidence correlating such requirements to
job performance; but evidence that use of women guards in "contact" positions in
maximum-security male penitentiaries would be security problem falls within bona
fide occupational qualification exception); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188 (1974) (Equal Pay Act does not allow male/female salary differentials
based on work performed during day and night); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp.,
726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984) (under Title VII as amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act employer retains burden of showing that work limitations on pregnant
women are necessary).
103 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1789.
104 Id. at 1789-90. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. Professor
Brodin criticized a Mount Healthy approach to liability in Title VII cases because it
appeared to be an anathema to one of the primary goals of Title VII-elimination
of discrimination in employment opportunities. Brodin, supra note 4 at 316-26. He
asked why "an employer [should] be permitted to avoid liability completely by
showing that his consideration of the unlawful factor happened in this particular
instance to be 'harmless'?" But see Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798 (O'Connor, J.
concurring) ("Congress clearly conditioned legal liability on a determination that
the consideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangible employment injury of
some kind.").
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ployer's decision, the employer demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision 10 would
have been
5
made absent the union activity consideration.
In an attempt to provide guidance to the lower courts, Justice Brennan emphasized that gender must have been a motivating factor in the decision at the time it was made.' 0 6 Remarks
alone, the plurality explained, are not sufficient proof of discrimination. 10 7 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer relied on the illegitimate factor in arriving at its decision.' 0 8 Justice
Brennan refrained, however, from outlining ways of proving that
stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision.' 0 9 Nonetheless, the plurality found that Hopkins met this
first hurdle by showing that the Policy Board relied on stereotypic views held by senior partners in making their decisions."O
Thus, the Price Waterhouse plurality was unwilling to ignore the
effect of sexual stereotyping; it perceptively understood the critical role these comments can play in promotional decisions."'
The plurality tempered its decision, however, by requiring
the employer to meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than applying the lower court's standard of clear
and convincing evidence." 2 Thus, Justice Brennan applied conventional rules of evidence which generally govern civil litigation
105 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1790 (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)).
106 Id. at 1791-92. The Court noted that it was not sufficient for an employer to
show that, at the time the decision was made, the decision was "motivated only in
part by a legitimate reason." Id. at 1791. The legitimate reason standing alone
must have induced it to make the decision. Id. at 1792.
107 Id. at 1791.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1794. The Court noted that negative comments may influence the partner to think less of a candidate. Id.
I II Id. See generally Taub, Keeping Women In Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form
of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345 (1980). Professor Taub argued that
stereotyping per se should constitute a recognized form of discrimination because
"it focuses attention on, and thereby increases awareness of an important mechanism by which equal employment opportunity is denied." Id. at 402. She believes
that if this is done, conduct which is seen as trivial will be perceived as harmful. Id.
Professor Taub questioned whether " 'aggressiveness' [can] ever be a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting an applicant?" Id. at 395. She asserts that
"by basing personnel decisions on the conclusory attribution of stereotypic traits,
the employer may well be using means which are 'fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.'" ld. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). See
also Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 51, at 32-33 (elaborating on affect of stereotyping in employment decisions and demonstrating how the intent to discriminate can
arise from inarticulate beliefs or unconscious assumptions).
112 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792.
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in Title VII cases. "t 3 In so doing, the plurality differentiated between the standard of proof necessary to avoid equitable relief
and that required to avoid liability under Title VII."14 The pre-

ponderance standard which is required to avoid liability, the plurality reasoned, was appropriate in the instant case because it was
consistent with the Court's holding that there is no violation of
Title VII upon a showing that the same decision would have been
made in the absence of the discriminatory factor." 5 Justice Brennan reasoned that the clear and convincing standard has been
used when the government attempts to utilize unusual coercive
action and is rarely used when a plaintiff seeks conventional relief. 1 6 Further, the plurality recognized that the higher standard
was used in7 the Title VII area when dealing with the proper form
of relief. 1

Justice White, writing separately and concurring in the judgment, found the plurality's discussion of causation and its creation of an affirmative defense unnecessary." 8 Mount Healthy, in
Justice White's view, provided the appropriate approach to the
allocation of the burden of proof. Justice White reasoned that
when constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial factor
in an employment decision the employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, absent that factor, the same decision would have been made." 9 Justice White, however, departed
from the plurality's requirement that the employer must introduce objective evidence to carry its burden.120 Injustice White's
judgment, the employer need only demonstrate through credible
testimony that the employer's legitimate reasons
would provide
1 21
sufficient grounds for the contested decision.
113 Id. See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 715-16 (1983) (lower courts should not treat discrimination differently from
other ultimate questions of fact).
114 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792. See also Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) (Court "noted the clear distinction
between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had
sustained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix
the amount"); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c)(2) (1989) (involving the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission regulation which requires federal agencies that violate
Title VII to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the same decision
would have been made in order to avoid relief).
115 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
119 Id. See also Brodin, supra note 4, at 306-08.
120 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (WhiteJ, concurring).
121 Id.
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In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor attacked
the plurality's interpretation of Title VII's causation requirement
and the broad application that the plurality afforded its holding. 22 Relying on the legislative history and statutory language
of Title VII, Justice O'Connor asserted that in order for there to
be a violation of Title VII, Congress intended that an illegitimate
23
factor must be the cause of an adverse employment decision.
Justice O'Connor unconditionally equated this requirement with
"but-for" causation. 124 She noted, however, that the legislative
history was less clear regarding which party has the burden of
proof on the issue of causation-the issue presented in this
case. 125
Justice O'Connor recognized that Congress intended the
plaintiff to bear the burden of proof to establish the elements of
her case. 1 26 Nevertheless, by looking to tort principles of multiple causation, Justice O'Connor noted that in some cases this allocation would be inconsistent with the policy considerations
behind Title VII. 127 Justice O'Connor determined that in accord-

ance with the intended deterrent effect of Title VII, the burden
must shift once the plaintiff has shown that an illegitimate factor
was given substantial weight in an adverse employment decision. 2 8 In Justice O'Connor's view, the presumption of good
faith disappears at this point, and the employer must show that
"despite the smoke, there is no fire:" that the same decision
29
would have been made absent the discriminatory factor.
In Justice O'Connor's view, a departure from the McDonnell
Douglas standard was also justified because in Price Waterhouse the
30
Court was presented with direct evidence of discrimination.
Alternatively, the Justice reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case was based on the statistical probability that an
illegitimate factor may have motivated the decision.' 3 ' Justice
O'Connor recognized that in Price Waterhouse the lower court
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Justice O'Connor's view, a violation of Title VII occurs when the discriminatory factor is the "but for" cause of an
unfavorable employment action. Id.
124 Id. This is in opposition to the plurality's reading of Title VIi's causation
requirement. See id. at 1785 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1797-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
129 Id. at 1798-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 1801-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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found that Hopkins had proved that Price Waterhouse relied on
stereotypic attitudes toward women in arriving at its decision not
to make her a partner. 32 Overt stereotyping was found in the
11 3
partners' evaluations and in comments made directly to her.
Thus, Justice O'Connor would require the plaintiff to carry a
greater burden than would Justice White. 1 34 She stressed that
there must be direct evidence that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employment decision before a Price Waterhouse
35
framework would apply. 1
To justify this construction, Justice O'Connor reiterated that
the allocation of the burden of proof often reflects a party's
greater access to evidence.' 3 6 In the instant case, Justice
O'Connor recognized that once Hopkins established a quantum
of discrimination, requiring Hopkins to show that discrimination
was the exact cause of her injury would be unduly burdensome. 1 37 This is particularly true in a professional situation
where promotional decisions are based on a myriad of reasons,
many of which are subjective.'
Like the plurality, however, Justice O'Connor failed to identify precisely what suffices as direct
evidence of discrimination and
at what point that evidence con1 9
factor.
substantial
a
stitutes
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, criticized the plurality for departing from the McDonnell Douglas framework and aggravating a
difficult area already wrought with confusion. 140 The dissent denounced the standard of causation employed by the plurality as
inherently inconsistent and misdirected.''
Like Justice
VII
was
aimed
at emO'Connor, the dissent argued that Title
1
ployment decisions that resulted from illegal motives. 2 In JusId. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
134 Id. at 1801-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White did not distinguish
this case from the McDonnell Douglas line of cases by the existence of direct evidence. See id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Internationl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) ("[plresumptions shifting the
burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and
to conform with a party's superior access to the proof").
137 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1802-03 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
138 Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 1804-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1806-07 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132

'33
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tice Kennedy's view, this was synonymous with "but-for"
causation which, while facially rejected by the plurality, was later
14 3
employed in the context of an affirmative defense.
the dissent explained that Burdine offered two methods for
the plaintiff to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion--either
upon direct proof of discrimination or upon showing that the
employer's justification was pretextual.' 4 4 Thus Burdine, Justice
Kennedy emphasized, provided a flexible framework within
which the plaintiff could persuade the Court directly that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer, or indirectly by dem14 5
onstrating that the legitimate reason offered was inadequate.
Moreover, the dissent argued that contrary to Justice O'Connor's
concern with the employee's inferior access to evidence, the employee would not be disadvantaged because of the availability of
liberal discovery rules and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigative files.' 4 6 In addition, Justice Kennedy noted
that requiring the employer to present clear and specific reasons
for the contested decision would alleviate the possibility of a spe47
cious defense prevailing. 1
Finally, the dissent expressed concern that the decision
would prompt needless litigation regarding the determination of
whether evidence was direct and constituted a substantial factor
in the employment decision. 148 The dissent asserted that such
illusory determinations unnecessarily complicate a difficult
area. 14' These ramifications, Justice Kennedy concluded, will
also be felt in areas which borrow from Title VII order of
0
proof.15
The dissent's astute criticism that Price Waterhouse will spawn
a generation of litigation regarding direct evidence and substantial factors, however, does not completely negate the Court's
laudable effort to grapple with the deficiencies of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Price Waterhouse is an attempt to further the
goals and intentions of Title VII by shifting the burden of per143

Id.

144 Id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 715 (1983)). Justice Kennedy posited that the prima facie case was "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." Id.
146 Id. at 1812-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
150 Id.
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suasion to the employer in specific situations. 15 ' Here, Hopkins
not only fulfilled the elements of a prima facie case, she demonstrated that her gender played a part in the decision making
pro52
cess-precisely what Title VII was intended to eradicate.'
Professional employment decisions, particularly those made
at senior levels, involve a number of factors, many of which are
subjective.' 5 1 Permitting the employer to avoid liability by
merely articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection, when evidence has been presented that impermissible criteria played a motivating part in the employment
decision, removes the bite of Title VII. Within the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the employer's task in a mixed-motives case
was minimal. 54 Articulating one legitimate nondiscriminatory
factor neither proves the absence of discrimination, nor estab151 Id. It is noteworthy that during the Court's October 1988 term, the Price
Waterhouse decision stood as a lone victory in the civil rights area. During that term,
the Court simultaneously limited the scope and effect of well developed civil rights
and Title VII case law. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989) (racial harassment in employment situation is not actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1981-a section which only prohibits racial discrimination in making and
enforcing of private contracts); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2261 (1989) (Title VII statute of limitations commences at time of adoption of seniority system rather than when alleged adverse effects are felt thus barring claim of
discrimination based on facially neutral seniority system); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.
Ct. 2180 (1989) (allowing white fire fighters to challenge reverse discrimination
decisions despite their failure to timely intervene in employment discrimination
proceedings); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (severely
restricting kinds of statistical evidence that will be acceptable to support disparate
impact claim under Title VII and holding that plaintiff alleging "disparate impact"
retain burden of proof throughout case); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109
S. Ct. 706 (1989) (requiring strict scrutiny analysis to affirmative action programs
and firm evidentiary basis for determining that underrepresentation of minorities
was result of past discrimination).
152 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd,
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The court noted that
"in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
See Hauck, Burdine: Sex Discrimination,Promotion, and Arbitration, 33 LAB. L.J. 434, 441
(1982). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 1775 (1989), Judge Green noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework is
necessary to establish discrimination when there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 470. He stated that it would be inappropriate to require the defendant, simply on the basis of inference of discrimination to prove that discrimination
was not "but-for" cause of challenged decision. Id. Rather, the McDonnell Douglas
framework sought to establish whether employee was treated less favorably. Id.
153 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1803.
154 See Recent Development, Defendant's Burden of Proofin Title VII Class Action Disparate Treatment Suits, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 755, 759 n.36 (1982) (citing cases which
interpret elements of prima facie case as not being particularly burdensome).
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lishes that a violation of Title VII has not occurred. The Price
Waterhouse plurality, however, stopped short of fully extending
the McDonnell Douglas framework by allowing the employer to escape liability through an affirmative defense once gender has
15
been shown to have played a motivating part in the decision. '
The Hopkins district court offered a more equitable solution. 15 6 By reasoning that the employer cannot escape liability,
but only equitable relief by meeting the "same decision" test,
Judge Gesell was faithful to the policy considerations of Title VII.
This outcome was also consistent with Mount Healthy.' 5 7 In Mount
Healthy the Court "rejected the view that a public employee must
be reinstated whenever constitutionally protected conduct play[ed]
a 'substantial' part in the employer's decision to terminate."' 5"
The difference in these two approaches is critical. In both situations, even if the same decision would have been made, the employer has allowed impermissible considerations to flourish in
the decision-making process. 59 A finding of liability by the Price
Waterhouse Court would have been a clear signal that this evaluation process was indeed improper. Such a finding would also allow the plaintiff an award of nominal damages and attorney
fees.160 By instead allowing Price Waterhouse to possibly escape
liability, rather than simply avoid reinstating Hopkins, and/or
paying her back salary, the Court has sanctioned an executive
promotional system which is anathema to the principles behind
Title VII. On remand, if Price Waterhouse satisfies its burden, the
fact that gender was a motivating part of the employment deci155 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787. It is important to note, however, that the
employers burden may be interpreted by the courts to be heavy. For example, on
remand the district court found that Price Waterhouse did not overcome this burden in spite of the firm's claims that Hopkins has poor interpersonal skills. N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
156 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
158 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285
(1977)). The Givhan Court repeated the concern voiced in Mount Healthy that a rule
requiring reinstatement of employees "could place an employee in a better position
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have
occupied had he done nothing." Id. (citations omitted).
159 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd,
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989). The district court
emphasized that "the maintenance of a system that gave weight to such biased criticisms was a conscious act of the partnership as a whole .... [P]laintiff appears to
have been a victim of 'omissive and subtle' discrimination created by a system that
made evaluations based on 'outmoded attitudes' determinative." Id. at 1119.
160 Stonefield, supra note 52, at 123-24.
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sion becomes irrelevant. Granted, employers must have the ability to weed out unsatisfactory employees. But the Court's
concern with this right has materialized into a framework where
under certain circumstances proven acts of discrimination will
get lost in the judicial maze.
Further, although Justice O'Connor distinguished herself
from the plurality by attempting to clarify the circumstances
under which the Price Waterhouse framework ought to apply, her
distinctions may prove unworkable in the lower courts. Justice
O'Connor's requirement of direct evidence is somewhat illusory
given the widespread view that in many cases circumstantial evidence may be as compelling as direct evidence. 16 1 Furthermore,
today the Court more often confronts situations where the intentional discrimination is covert. 16 2 Even assuming arguendo that
Justice O'Connor is correct in her classification of Hopkins' evidence as "direct proof" of discrimination, one cannot help wondering why the existence of comments such as those from the
senior partner present the only kind of situation where the burden of proof should shift to the employer.' 63 Should not the
combination of (1) Hopkin's innate talents,' 64 (2) her uncontested ability to secure large fees which were critical to the office, 16 5 (3) her unsurpassed billable hours 1 66 (4) and her clients'
praise,"' coupled with (5) the insignificant number of female
partners, 168 (6) the evaluations that characterized her as "aggressive," ' 16 9 and (7) the fact that male managers with poor interpersonal skills were made partners 170 have been enough? Doesn't
this set of circumstantial evidence establish a situation where
161 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE AT TRIALS IN COMMON LAW 961 § 26 (1983). Wigmore
cited cases which stand for the proposition that "there is no sound reason" for a
drawing distinction between the value of direct and circumstantial evidence. Id. at
961 n.3 (citations omitted). Wigmore also provided a detailed definition of direct
evidence and compared it to other kinds of evidence. Id. at 948-50.
162 Stonefield, supra note 52, at 108 n.74.
163 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1802 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("as the decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those
privy to the decision making process that her gender was a major reason for the
rejection of her ljartnership bid" (emphasis in original)).
164 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989).
165

Id.

Id.
Id.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd,
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
169 Id. at 1113.
170 Id.
166
167
168
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"the employer [may have] created uncertainty as to causation by
knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion[?]'' 1 Moreover, the fact that Judge Gesell and Justice
O'Connor differ on the very classification of Hopkins' evidence
imas "direct" or "circumstantial" is perhaps a harbinger of the172
courts.
lower
the
in
result
likely
will
which
pending conflict
Additionally, although Price Waterhouse may well be viewed as
a narrow holding applicable to particularly egregious situations,
the Court's unwillingness to clarify the criteria which necessitates
Price Waterhouse analyses affords Price Waterhouse a more frequent
application. Imagine the difficulty in deciding whether a particular case is one to which Price Waterhouse applies, or one to which
McDonnell Douglas applies. 17 Before Price Waterhouse can be invoked, the judge must determine through discovery whether the
plaintiff's evidence of discrimination is a motivating factor in the
employment decision, and whether it is direct proof of discrimination. The later requirement of direct proof will only be necessary for those judges who read Justice O'Connor's, rather than
Justice White's, opinion along with the plurality's opinion.
With either situation, plaintiff has established more than the
prima facie case required by McDonnell Douglas. In Price
Waterhouse if a majority is viewed as being formed with the addition of Justice O'Connor, the employer must then produce "objective evidence" of legitimate factors which motivated its
decision.' 7 4 The objective evidence must show that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the unlawful factor. 1 75 Presumably, statement that Hopkins' poor interpersonal
skills prevented her from making partner would not be enough.
Justice O'Connor appears to demand verifiable job evaluations
which demonstrate that the lawful factor alone would have been
1 76
determinative to the decision.
171 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1796 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
172 Compare Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1119 ("there is no direct evidence of a determined purpose to maliciously discriminate against women . . .")with Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1805 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[w]hat is required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in
reaching their decision").
173 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798 n.12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Indeed,
the plurality noted that they expect plaintiffs to allege that their cases involve
mixed-motives, and in the alternative, are pretextual. Id.
174 Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176 Id.
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If the judge does not believe that the legitimate factors alone
would have produced the same decision, the employer is liable
under-Title VII. Similarly, if the judge is uncertain as to which
factors were critical to the decision, the employee is similarly entitled to a judgment in her favor. In this narrow situation, plaintiffs benefit from the addition of Price Waterhouse to Title VII
individual disparate treatment case law.
A majority can also be formed, however, by adding Justice
White's opinion to the plurality. Justice White differs from Justice O'Connor on the kind of the evidence necessary to invoke a
Price Waterhouse framework, as well as the scope of evidence by
which a defendant can escape liability.' 77 First, in Justice White's
view, the plaintiff need not demonstrate with direct evidence that
"unlawful motive[s] [were] a substantial factor in the adverse employment action."' 78 In substance, Justice Whitejoins the plurality in requiring the plaintiff to show that the illegitimate criteria
was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor. In addition, Justice
White broadened the scope of admissible evidence available to
the employer to show that the same decision would have been
made. 79 For Justice White, the employer need only "credibly
testify" rather than produce objective evidence that the same decision would have been made absent the unlawful factor. 80 A
partner's testimony that Hopkin's failure to make partner was
based on her poor interpersonal skills would presumably satisfy
this requirement.
With the addition ofJustice White's opinion to form a majority, once all the evidence is presented, if the judge does not believe that the decision would have been the same, then the
outcome would be similar to those courts that find a majority
with Justice O'Connor. Plaintiffs will benefit from those cases
where the judge does not believe that the same decision would
have been made based solely on the legitimate factor and where
the judge is uncertain as to which factors were critical to the
decision.
Alternatively, if the judge determines that the employee has
only made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the McDonnell
Douglas framework is invoked. Under McDonnell Douglas, the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for the challenged de177 Id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
178

Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).

179 Id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
180

Id.
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cision.' 8 ' If the employer's reason is found to be pretextual, the
illegal reason, in effect, becomes the sole cause of the employer's
action and the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 182 The underlying assumption in this scenario is that Price Waterhouse does not apply
because it is a single motive rather than a mixed-motives case.
That is to say that there are no legitimate reasons for the employment decision because the legitimate reasons are found to be a
pretext for discrimination. Under this scenario, if the judge is
uncertain of the employer's motives-whether the proffered reason is truly a pretext for discrimination-the employment decision will stand because under McDonnell Douglas the employer has
the burden of persuasion.
Thus, irrespective of the Court's attempt to limit its decision,
lower courts will undoubtedly be flooded with claims brought
under Title VII alleging mixed-motives, and involving evidence
which the plaintiff deems is direct proof that discrimination
played a motivating part in the employment decision so as to invoke a Price Waterhouse analysis. In the pre-Price Waterhouse era,
what may have constituted a pretext case, and therefore, require
a McDonnell Doulgas three-tiered burden shifting analysis, may
well be, post-Price Waterhouse, a mixed-motive, substantial factor
case. In this respect, plaintiffs will be well advised to rely on Price
Waterhouse to the extent that their situation warrants.
Thus, in Price Waterhouse, the Court advances toward adopting procedural rules which allow plaintiffs to recover for discriminatory actions in the workplace. The Court, however,
simultaneously tempers the extent of that recovery by allowing
employers to avoid liability through an affirmative defense once
discrimination has been established. By failing to instruct the
lower courts on the specific circumstances to which this framework should apply, the Court falls short of extending the McDonnell Douglas framework in a meaningful manner. This, combined
with the Court's failure to delineate the application of the Price
Waterhouse framework, does little to advance the objectives
sought by Congress in enacting Title VII.
Linda W Filardi
181
182

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id. at 807.

